Who Belongs on an IT Risk Team, and Who Gets Left Off
- John Edwards
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A useful IT risk team mixes security, infrastructure, finance and operations, and it needs one named owner. Here's who CIOs should seat and why.

The hardest part of building an IT risk team usually isn't writing the charter. It's deciding who gets a chair. Most enterprises already accept that risk management matters, but a team that only contains engineers will tend to measure risk in technical terms and miss what actually hurts the business.
Why the Binance case keeps coming up
The breach at cryptocurrency exchange Binance is the example advisers reach for, and for good reason. The reported theft of $6.3 billion in digital assets was only part of the damage. Customers also pulled at least $3 billion of their own assets, which turned a security incident into a confidence and liquidity problem. The attack combined social engineering with a fake job interview, so it went after people as well as systems.
That's the lesson for CIOs. A threat that can wipe out earnings doesn't respect org charts. It moves across security, customer trust, finance and operations at once, so the team that responds has to span those functions too.
The core seats: security, infrastructure and finance
Chris McGlasson, a fractional CIO for several midmarket firms, keeps his teams small and cross-functional on purpose. His starting list is practical: someone who owns security, someone who owns infrastructure and backups, a partner in finance, and a leader from operations.
The finance seat is the one teams most often leave empty, and McGlasson treats it as non-negotiable. His reasoning is simple: every risk decision is really a business decision. A patch window, a failover design or a vendor exit carries a cost and a revenue impact, and someone at the table needs to put numbers on those trade-offs before the team picks one.
Operations is the second seat people forget. Operations staff know which systems actually keep the doors open. That often differs from what the architecture diagram shows. A risk register built only from diagrams will rank the wrong systems as critical, and the team won't notice until something breaks.
Risk belongs to the business, not the IT department
Paul Zikmund, who teaches in the chief risk program at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College, pushes the idea further. He argues that an effective IT risk team can't operate as a technical island. It has to work as a cross-disciplinary council that lines up directly with enterprise risk management.
His view is that core IT operations, infrastructure, architecture and information security leaders are foundational, but the team must extend to business stakeholders. IT risks rarely stay inside the server room or the cloud account. Business unit leaders help the team judge risk by operational impact instead of by how severe a vulnerability looks in isolation.
Zikmund's distinction is worth taking seriously. A high-performing IT risk team, he says, isn't an IT committee with a new name. It's a governance body where technical, operational, legal and financial leaders jointly own the digital risk profile. If the team only reports up through IT, the business will treat its findings as a technical issue to be scheduled, not a decision to be made.
Vendors are part of the risk surface
McGlasson makes a point that many teams skip. "Your MSP and your cloud providers are part of your risk surface, whether you're actively managing them or not," he said. Someone on the team should own vendor risk directly, including contract terms, service dependencies and what happens when a provider has a bad day.
That's where external perspective earns its place. Bryan Martin, CTO at contact center and unified communications firm 8x8, says looking for outside partners is always a good idea, though he believes most leaders wait too long to do it.
Fresh eyes and the people gap
Internal staff know the environment well, which is useful, but Mark Sternig, CTO at healthcare IT, data and security firm Focus, sees a blind spot. Long-tenured engineers quietly learn to live with risks that a newcomer would flag on day one. Without anyone pushing back, those risks become background noise.
Sternig points to what an outside hire or outside adviser brings: pattern exposure. People who have seen similar failures at other organizations can spot early warning signs that the internal team has stopped noticing. "They've watched this go wrong at plenty of other organizations," he said, "so they can catch the early warning your own team has stopped noticing."
Tengo Meskhi, former deputy CIO at Bank of Georgia and now CEO of London-based consultancy Conceptdigital, calls underestimating the human side the biggest mistake IT leaders make when building these teams. Most teams, he says, are built to defend the perimeter and its systems, and almost nothing is built to defend the people.
His point about social engineering is hard to argue with. Phishing and pretexting can get past technically sound controls, and few teams include anyone whose job is to test and train the staff who will be targeted. Meskhi's fix is concrete: add a line for people to the risk register, and give someone ownership of it, because this is often the easiest vulnerability to exploit.
Give the risk register one owner
McGlasson's most actionable advice is to name one owner. That person is accountable for the risk register, the review cadence and the uncomfortable conversations that come with them. Without that seat, risk drifts between IT, finance and operations.
"The biggest risk isn't a missing control, it's that risk floats between IT, finance and operations, and belongs to no one," he said. "Other responsibilities become easier once that seat is filled."
Zikmund frames the failure mode as creating a technical vacuum. A team that doesn't speak the language of the business, or doesn't work closely with the central enterprise risk function, will evaluate technology risks in isolation. The goal is to judge each technology risk through enterprise resilience and strategic continuity.
What to do with this
If you're rebuilding an IT risk team, start with the seats, not the tooling. Confirm you have security, infrastructure and backup ownership, a finance partner who can price trade-offs, and an operations voice who knows the real critical path. Then give the team a line to the enterprise risk function and a named owner for the register.
Two checks are worth running now. First, ask whether your vendors and MSPs appear in the risk register at all. Second, ask whether anyone is responsible for the people side of the risk, including phishing tests and staff training. If the answer to either is no, that's where the next incident is most likely to start.